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1Secure Repairable Fountain Codes
Siddhartha Kumar, Student Member, IEEE, Eirik Rosnes, Senior Member, IEEE,
and Alexandre Graell i Amat, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this letter, we provide the construction of re-
pairable fountain codes (RFCs) for distributed storage systems
that are information-theoretically secure against an eavesdropper
that has access to the data stored in a subset of the storage nodes
and the data downloaded to repair an additional subset of storage
nodes. The security is achieved by adding random symbols to
the message, which is then encoded by the concatenation of a
Gabidulin code and an RFC. We compare the achievable code
rates of the proposed codes with those of secure minimum storage
regenerating codes and secure locally repairable codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
THe design of information-theoretically secure distributedstorage systems (DSSs) has attracted a significant interest
in the last few years [1], [2]. DSSs use erasure correcting
codes (ECCs) to yield fault tolerance against storage node
failures. The resiliency of the DSS against passive attacks is a
good measure of its security. Passive attacks are those where
the attacker (referred to as the eavesdropper) gains access to
a subset of storage nodes and thereby to partial information
on the data stored on the DSS. Information-theoretic security
against such attacks involves mixing of information symbols
(called the message) with random symbols, prior to encoding
by an ECC, in a manner such that the eavesdropper does not
gain any information about the original message even if he
has access to some code symbols.
Using this idea, [1], [2] provided explicit constructions of
minimum storage regenerating (MSR) codes that achieve secu-
rity for an (`1, `2) eavesdropper model where the eavesdropper
has access to the content of `1 storage nodes and the data
that needs to be downloaded to repair `2 additional storage
nodes. The design of secure locally repairable codes (LRCs)
was also addressed in [2]. In particular, to achieve security,
random symbols are appended to the message and the resulting
vector of symbols is precoded by a Gabidulin code [3] prior
to encoding by an LRC (or MSR code) in [2]. Achieving
security comes at the expense of a lower code rate with
respect to the original LRC (or MSR code), due to appending
random symbols to the message [2]. For the LRC- and MSR-
based secure codes, the authors in [2] derived the maximum
message size (equivalently, the maximum code rate) that
allows to achieve security. Moreover, the code constructions
in [2] achieve this maximum. A sufficient condition for the
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information leakage to the eavesdropper to be zero was also
given in [1], [2].
LRCs [4] and MSR codes [5] are appealing code families
because they are repair efficient. Repairable fountain codes
(RFCs) are another class of repair-efficient ECCs [6]. Like
LRCs, they yield a good locality, which implies that few
storage nodes are involved in the repair of a failed node.
In this letter, we present the construction of RFCs that are
information-theoretically secure for the (`1, `2) eavesdropper
model. As in [2], we achieve security by appending random
symbols to the message and precoding by a Gabidulin code.
We prove that the proposed code construction is completely
secure for the (`1, `2) eavesdropper model. To prove security,
we give a necessary condition for the information leakage
to the eavesdropper to be zero, thus extending the sufficient
condition in [1], [2]. Our proof differs from the one in [1],
[2] and is based on simple information theory equalities. We
compare the achievable code rates (the maximum code rate
that allows to achieve security) of the proposed codes with
those of secure MSR codes and LRCs in [2]. We show that,
for a given rate of the underlying code (RFC, LRC, or MSR
code), secure RFCs yield the same achievable code rates as
those of secure LRCs and better than those of secure MSR
codes when the rate of the underlying code is high enough.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a DSS with n storage nodes, each storing
one symbol. A message m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mk ), of length k
symbols mi ∈ GF(qp), i = 1, . . . , k, where q is a prime and
p is a positive integer, is first encoded using an (n, k) ECC
of rate R = k/n into a codeword c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) of length
n. Each of the n code symbols ci , i = 1, . . . , n, is then stored
into a different storage node. We assume that code symbol ci
is stored in the ith storage node and, with a slight abuse of
notation, we will refer to both code symbol and storage node
i by ci .
Example 1. The bipartite graph shown in Fig. 1(a) represents
a message stored on a DSS with n = 6 storage nodes
using a (6, 4) ECC. Each code symbol ci , i = 1, . . . , 6, is
a linear combination of its neighboring message symbols mi ,
i = 1, . . . , 4 (circles). Each code symbol (squares) is stored on
a different storage node.
A. Security Model
We consider an (`1, `2) eavesdropper model [2], where
the eavesdropper can passively observe, but not modify, the
content of ` = `1 + `2 < k storage nodes. Out of the
` nodes, the eavesdropper can observe the symbols stored
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Fig. 1: A DSS with 6 storage nodes employing a (6, 4) ECC. m =
(m1,m2,m3,m4) is encoded into the codeword c = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6).
Each code symbol is stored in a storage node. (a) Bipartite graph of the (6, 4)
ECC; squares and circles represent code symbols (storage nodes) and message
symbols, respectively. (b) Example of a (1, 1) eavesdropper, where S1 = {c1 }
and S2 = {c2 } (in red). Gray symbols are the symbols that the eavesdropper
obtains.
in a subset of `1 storage nodes, which we denote by S1
(|S1 |= `1). Furthermore, it can observe the data downloaded
during the repair of a subset of `2 storage nodes, denoted by
S2 (|S2 |= `2), where S1 ∩ S2 = ∅. This model is relevant in
the scenario where nodes are located at different geographical
locations. Peer-to-peer storage systems are examples of such
DSSs [1]. We denote the subset of storage nodes from which
data is downloaded to repair storage nodes in S2 by Sd.
We will refer to the symbols the eavesdropper obtains as the
eavesdropped symbols. We also assume that the eavesdropper
has perfect knowledge of the ECC used for encoding.
Definition 1 ( [1], [2]). Let e be the vector of eavesdropped
symbols that the eavesdropper obtains from the storage nodes
in S1 ∪Sd. A DSS storing a message m (possibly encoded by
an ECC) is said to be completely secure against an (`1, `2)
eavesdropper if the mutual information between the message
and the eavesdropped symbols is zero, i.e., I (m; e) = 0.
Example 2. Fig. 1(b) shows an example of a (1, 1) eavesdrop-
per where S1 = {c1} and S2 = {c2}. Thus, the eavesdropper
obtains c1 = m1 and the downloaded data c5 = m2 + m4 and
c4 = m4, and thereby m2, during the repair of S2 = {c2}.
In all, the eavesdropper obtains the symbols m1,m2,m4, and
c5 = m2 + m4, colored in gray in the figure.
III. GABIDULIN AND REPAIRABLE FOUNTAIN CODES
We summarize Gabidulin codes and RFCs, which are the
building blocks of the secure RFCs presented in Section IV.
A. Gabidulin Codes
Gabidulin codes are a class of rank codes [3]. An (N, K )
Gabidulin code (over GF(qp)) of length N , dimension K , and
minimum rank distance Dmin, can correct up to Dmin − 1 rank
erasures. Gabidulin codes are maximum rank distance codes,
i.e., they achieve the Singleton bound, Dmin ≤ N −K + 1, and
are obtained by evaluations of polynomials. More specifically,
Gabidulin codes use linearized polynomials.
Definition 2. A linearized polynomial f (y) of degree t > 0
over GF(qp) has the form
f (y) =
t∑
i=0
aiyq
i
,
where ai ∈ GF(qp) and at , 0.
A message m = (m1, . . . ,mK ) is encoded using an (N, K )
Gabidulin code as follows.
1) Construct a polynomial f (y) =
∑K
i=1 miy
qi−1 .
2) Evaluate f (y) at N linearly independent (over GF(q))
points {y1, . . . , yN } ⊂ GF(qp) to obtain a codeword
( f (y1), . . . , f (yN )).
Decoding proceeds as follows.
1) Obtain any K evaluations at K linearly independent
(over GF(q)) points. Otherwise, decoding fails.
2) Perform polynomial interpolation on the K evaluations
and recover the original message m by solving a system
of linear equations.
B. Repairable Fountain Codes
An (n, k) systematic RFC encodes a message m =
(m1, . . . ,mk ) ∈ GF(qp), q > k, into a codeword c =
(c1, . . . , cn), where ci = mi for i = 1, . . . , k. The parity
symbols ci , i = k + 1, . . . , n, are constructed according to the
following three-step procedure.
1) Successively select ξ = O(log k) message symbols in-
dependently and uniformly at random with replacement.
2) For each of the ξ message symbols, a coefficient is
drawn uniformly at random from GF(q) ⊂ GF(qp).
3) The parity symbol is then obtained as the linear combi-
nation of the ξ chosen message symbols, weighted by
the corresponding coefficients.
Each of the n code symbols is stored in a different storage
node. From the code construction, each parity symbol is a
weighted sum of at most ξ message symbols. A parity symbol
and the corresponding (at most) ξ message symbols is referred
to as a local group. The existence of local groups is a hallmark
of any ECC having low locality. Unlike LRCs, which have
only disjoint local groups, RFCs also have overlapping local
groups [6]. Furthermore, for each systematic symbol there
exist a number of disjoint local groups from which it can
be reconstructed. This allows multiple parallel reads of the
systematic symbol, accessing the disjoint local groups. When
a storage node fails, it is repaired from one of its local groups.
This requires the download of at most ξ symbols (from the
other at most ξ nodes of the local group). Thus, RFCs have
low locality, ξ, and their repair bandwidth is ξp log q. Also,
RFCs are near maximum distance separable codes.
IV. SECURE REPAIRABLE FOUNTAIN CODES
In this section, we present the construction of RFCs that are
secure against the (`1, `2) eavesdropper model. The proposed
secure RFCs are obtained by concatenating a Gabidulin code
and an RFC. More precisely, consider an (n, k˜) RFC such that
each parity symbol is a random linear combination of up to ξ
randomly chosen input symbols. Let m denote the message of
length k = k˜ − `1 − ξ`2 symbols. A codeword of the proposed
secure RFC is constructed as follows.
1) Append to m a random vector r = (r1, . . . , ru) of
length u = `1 + ξ`2 symbols, drawn independently and
3uniformly at random from GF(qp), thus obtaining the
vector m˜ = (m, r).
2) Outer code. Encode m˜ using a (k˜, k˜) Gabidulin code
to obtain the intermediate codeword c˜ = (c˜1, . . . , c˜k˜ ) =
( f (y1), . . . , f (yk˜ )).
3) Inner code. Encode c˜ using an (n, k˜) RFC into the
codeword c = (c1, . . . , cn). The n code symbols are then
stored in n storage nodes.
Remark 1. A GF(q)-linear combination of evaluations of
a linearized polynomial f (y) =
∑t
i=0 aiy
qi of some degree
t over GF(qp) (see Definition 2) is itself an evaluation of
the same linearized polynomial. In particular,
∑κ
j=1 γj f (βj ) =
f
(∑κ
j=1 γj βj
)
, where κ is a positive integer, γj ∈ GF(q),
and βj ∈ GF(qp), i.e., f (·) is a linear map over GF(q) [2,
Remark 8]. Thus, each code symbol ci , i = 1, . . . , n, is an
evaluation of a linearized polynomial f (·) of degree at most
k˜−1 and with coefficients from m˜ at some point yi ∈ GF(qp),
i.e., ci = f (yi) =
∑k˜
j=1 m˜j y
q j−1
i .
Example 3. Fig. 2 depicts a toy example of a (20, 10) secure
RFC for a (1, 1) eavesdropper. Here, m˜ comprises k = k˜ −
`1 − ξ`2 = 6 message symbols and u = `1 + ξ`2 = 4 random
symbols. m˜ is encoded using the concatenation of a (10, 10)
Gabidulin code and a (20, 10) RFC. Due to the outer encoding
by the Gabidulin code, each code symbol ci , i = 1, . . . , 20,
is an evaluation of a linearized polynomial (see Remark 1).
Another consequence is that the final code retains the repair
properties of the inner code (the RFC). For this example, the
code locality is ξ = 3.
In the following, we show that the proposed secure RFCs
achieve complete security for the (`1, `2) eavesdropper model.
We first prove a sufficient and necessary condition for
I (m; e) = 0 using an alternative proof to the one in [1], [2].
Theorem 1. Let m be a message which is stored in a DSS by
first appending to it a vector r of random symbols and then
encoding (m, r) by an ECC. Also, let e be the vector of code
symbols the eavesdropper has access to. Then, the information
leakage to the eavesdropper is zero, i.e., I (m; e) = 0, if and
only if H (r |m, e) = H (r) − H (e).
Proof: We prove the theorem using simple information
theory equalities,
I (m; e) = H (m) − H (m|e)
(a)
= H (m) − H (m|e) + H (e|m, r)
= H (m) − H (m|e) + H (e|m) − I (r; e|m)
(b)
= H (e) − I (r; e|m)
= H (e) − H (r |m) + H (r |e,m)
(c)
= H (e) − H (r) + H (r |e,m),
where (a) follows from the fact that H (e|m, r) = 0, since
eavesdropped symbols are a function of m and r, (b) follows
from H (e) − H (e|m) = H (m) − H (m|e), and (c) follows
from the fact that r and m are stochastically independent of
each other, i.e., H (r |m) = H (r). Thus,
I (m; e) = 0⇔ H (r |m, e) = H (r) − H (e). (1)
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10
c11 c12 c13 c14 c15 c16 c17 c18 c19 c20
c˜1 c˜2 c˜3 c˜4 c˜5 c˜6 c˜7 c˜8 c˜9 c˜10
Fig. 2: A (20, 10) secure RFC. Storage nodes S1 = {c6 } and S2 = {c5 } are
eavesdropped. Gray symbols are the symbols that the eavesdropper obtains.
We remark that in [1] and [2, Lem. 4] a sufficient condition
on I (m; e) = 0 was proved, whereas Theorem 1 gives a suffi-
cient and necessary condition. ECCs for which Theorem 1 is
satisfied do not leak any information, i.e., they are completely
secure. In Theorem 2 below, we use the following lemma to
prove that our proposed code construction is completely secure
for the (`1, `2) eavesdropper model.
Lemma 1. Consider the (`1, `2) eavesdropper model. For the
proposed code construction (with u = `1+ξ`2 random symbols
r), H (e) ≤ H (r) = (`1 + ξ`2)p log q, where e is the vector of
code symbols the eavesdropper has access to.
Proof: Consider the repair of a single storage node
ci in S2, and let Γ(i) denote the local group (there are
many) used for the repair of storage node ci . Each local
group contains one inner code parity symbol and at most ξ
inner code message symbols to which it is connected. Thus,
|Γ(i) |≤ ξ + 1. Since the inner code parity symbol is a GF(q)-
weighted linear combination of the (at most) ξ inner code
message symbols from the local group, Γ(i) contains at most
ξ stochastically independent symbols. Considering the repair
of all storage nodes in S2, it follows by the argument above
that at most ξ`2 stochastically independent inner code symbols
are eavesdropped during the repair process. Also, since each
storage node stores a single symbol, the eavesdropper has
access to an additional `1 inner code symbols from the storage
nodes in S1. Hence, in total, the eavesdropper has access
to at most `1 + ξ`2 stochastically independent symbols from
c. Thus, H (e) ≤ (`1 + ξ`2)p log q. Furthermore, since r
contains u = `1 + ξ`2 uniform independent random symbols,
H (r) = (`1 + ξ`2)p log q, and the result follows.
Theorem 2. The code comprising of a Gabidulin code as its
outer code and an RFC as its inner code, which encodes a
vector m˜ = (m, r) that consists of a message m of length k
and a random vector r of length u = `1 + ξ`2 is completely
secure for the (`1, `2) eavesdropper model.
Proof: To prove security, we show that H (r |e,m) =
H (r)−H (e), which is equivalent to I (m; e) = 0 according to
Theorem 1. Each eavesdropped symbol ei , i = 1, . . . ,w, where
w = |e|, corresponds to a code symbol and therefore is an
evaluation of f (·) at some point zi ∈ {y1, . . . , yn} ⊂ GF(qp),
4where ci = f (yi) (see Remark 1). Thus, for i = 1, . . . ,w,
ei = f (zi) =
k˜∑
j=1
m˜j z
q j−1
i =
k∑
j=1
mj z
q j−1
i +
u∑
j=1
rj z
qk+ j−1
i (2)
since m˜ = (m, r). In the following, r = (r1, . . . , ru) is
assumed to be the unknowns (the message m and the eaves-
dropper vector e are assumed to be known) in the linear system
of equations defined in (2).
Let 1 ≤ ν ≤ w (by definition) be the number of
GF(q)-linear independent symbols of {e1, . . . , ew }, denoted
by e˜ = (e˜1, . . . , e˜ν). The corresponding vector of points
from {z1, . . . , zw } is denoted by z˜ = ( z˜1, . . . , z˜ν). From (2),
e˜ = b(z˜,m) + r · A(z˜), where b(z˜,m) is a length-ν row
vector and A(z˜) is a u × ν matrix. Since {e˜1, . . . , e˜ν } are
GF(q)-linear independent, the matrix A(z˜) is of full column-
rank (i.e., its column space is a vector space over GF(q)
of dimension ν), and since the u random symbols in r are
chosen independently and uniformly at random from GF(pq),
{e˜1, . . . , e˜ν } are also stochastically independent uniformly
distributed random variables over GF(qp) (e˜i is uniformly
distributed over GF(qp) for all i and e˜ is uniformly distributed
over GF(qp)ν). Finally, since e ∈ {e1, . . . , ew } \ {e˜1, . . . , e˜ν }
can be written as a GF(q)-linear combination of {e˜1, . . . , e˜ν },
it follows that H (e) = H (e˜) = ν · p log q. From Lemma 1,
H (e) ≤ H (r). Thus, u ≥ ν since H (e) = ν · p log q and
H (r) = u ·p log q. The conditional entropy H (r |e,m) is equal
to the logarithm (base-2) of the number of solutions of (2)
when the number of unknowns u is larger than or equal to the
number of independent equations ν, i.e., when u ≥ ν. Hence,
H (r |m, e) = (u − ν)p log q = H (r) − H (e) from which the
result follows from (1) (see Theorem 1).
Example 4. Consider the (20, 10) secure RFC over GF (qp)
in Fig. 2 that encodes the message m = (m1, . . . ,m6) of 6
symbols and a vector r = (r1, . . . , r4) of 4 random symbols.
Each ci, i = 1, . . . , 20, is an evaluation of a linearized
polynomial f (·) at yi . For the (1, 1) eavesdropper model, the
scenario where S1 = {c6} and S2 = {c5}, i.e., the eavesdropper
gains access to the symbols e = (c5, c6, c8, c18 = c5 + c6 + c8),
is depicted. It can easily be seen that H (r) = 4p log q,
H (e) = 3p log q, and H (r |m, e) = (4 − 3)p log q. Therefore,
there is no information leakage to the eavesdropper.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We compare the proposed secure RFCs with the secure
MSR codes and secure LRCs in [2] in terms of the maximum
code rate k/n that allows to achieve security. In particular, we
consider (r, δ) dmin−optimal LRCs [2], where r is the code
locality (and thus has an analogous meaning to ξ for RFCs)
and dmin is the minimum distance of the code. Each local
group of such a code can be seen as a subcode (punctured
from the LRC) of minimum distance at least δ.
In Fig. 3, we fix the code rate of the inner code (RFC, LRC,
or MSR code), k˜/n, to 0.5 and 0.8, and plot the achievable
code rates (the maximum k/n that allows to achieve security)
for the (2, 2) eavesdropper model as a function of k˜. Note that
k˜/n is an upper bound on the achievable code rate k/n, since
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Fig. 3: Comparison of code rates for different classes of secure ECCs for the
(2, 2) eavesdropper model.
to achieve security a number of random symbols needs to be
appended to the message of length k. Note also that n is the
total number of storage nodes. We remark that, unlike LRC-
and RFC-based DSSs, where each code symbol is stored in
a different storage node, for MSR codes each storage node
stores α = (n − k˜)k˜−1 code symbols. For a fair comparison
between RFCs and LRCs, we set r = ξ. It can be seen that
the achievable code rates for secure RFCs and secure LRCs
are identical. On the other hand, secure RFCs yield higher
achievable code rates compared to secure MSR codes for
k˜/n = 0.8, while the opposite is observed for k˜/n = 0.5.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a code construction based on RFCs that is
secure against the (`1, `2) eavesdropper model. We gave a
necessary and sufficient condition for the information leakage
to the eavesdropper to be zero, and subsequently proved that
the proposed construction is completely secure. The proposed
secure RFCs yield the same achievable code rates as LRCs,
and higher than MSR codes (when the code rate of the
underlying code is high enough). An interesting extension of
this work would be the design of secure and repair-efficient
vector RFCs, i.e., code symbols are distributed over the storage
nodes, each containing α > 1 code symbols.
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